§ 53a-62. Threatening in the second degree: Class A misdemeanor or class D felony (a) A person is guilty of threatening in the second degree when: (1) By physical threat, such person intentionally places or attempts to place another person in fear of imminent serious physical injury, (2) (A) such person threatens to commit any crime of violence with the intent to terrorize another person, or (B) such person threatens to commit such crime of violence in reckless disregard of the risk of causing such terror, or (3) violates subdivision (1) or (2) of this subsection and the person threatened is in a building or on the grounds of a (A) house of religious worship, (B) religiously-affiliated community center, (C) public or nonpublic preschool, school or institution of higher education, or (D) day care center, as defined in section 19a-87g, during operational, preschool, school or instructional hours or when a building or the grounds of such house of worship, community center, preschool, school, institution or day care center are being used for the provision of religious or community services, or house of worship, community center, preschool, school, institution or day care center-sponsored activities. (b) For the purposes of this section, "religiously-affiliated community center" has the same meaning as provided in section 53a-61aa. (c) Threatening in the second degree is a class A misdemeanor, except that a violation of subdivision (3) of subsection (a) of this section is a class D felony. (1969, P.A. 828, § 63, eff. Oct. 1, 1971; 2001, Nov. Sp.Sess., P.A. 01-2, § 8, eff. Jan. 1, 2002; 2002, P.A. 02-97, § 16; 2016, P.A. 16-67, § 7; 2017, P.A. 17- 111, § 4.) COMMISSION COMMENT This section is a combination of the New York and Model Penal Code proposals. It covers three types of conduct: intentional physical threat of serious physical injury; threat to commit any crime of violence with intent to terrorize another; and threat to commit a crime of violence with intent to cause evacuation of a public transportation facility or otherwise to cause serious public inconvenience (e.g., a bomb scare). AUTHORS' COMMENTARY Under subsection (a)(1) of this section, which requires that the defendant placed the victim in fear of "imminent serious physical injury," the fact that the threatened harm was contingent on a future event does not disqualify it from
being a sufficient threat. "Imminent" in this section does not have the same meaning as under C.G.S.A. § 53a-19 , governing the use of force in self- defense. It includes, moreover, a threat made over the telephone. Thus, where the defendant telephoned the victim and told her that if she went to the police she would be "as good as dead," the threat was sufficient to place the victim in fear of imminent serious physical injury. State v. Snead, 41 Conn.App. 584, 677 A.2d 446 (1996) . RECENT CASE NOTES 1. State v. Hopkins, 62 Conn.App. 665, 669, 772 A.2d 657, 661 (2001) . [rejecting claim of insufficiency of evidence to support threatening conviction.] 2. State v. Crudup, 81 Conn. App. 248, 838 A.2d 1053 (2004) , certification denied, 268 Conn. 913, 845 A.2d 415 (2004) [rejecting claim that convictions of threatening and breach of peace constituted double jeopardy and that threatening statute was unconstitutionally vague]. 3. Charged with assaulting the victim and then threatening her with a knife that he placed against her back, the defendant in State v. Morales, 164 Conn. App. 143, 136 A.3d 278 (2016) , claimed on appeal that the trial court improperly admitted evidence of a prior uncharged incident with the same victim that occurred five months earlier in which the defendant had threatened her with a knife. Holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion, the Appellate Court wrote: In the present case, the relevant charge is threatening in the second degree, which is a specific intent crime. Pursuant to § 53a-62 (a)(1), to obtain a conviction of this offense, the state had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the defendant's intent to place the victim "in fear of imminent serious physical injury" when he held a knife to the victim's back and promised to kill her in July, 2013. The state proffered evidence that when the defendant, just five months earlier, in February, 2013, brandished a knife, the victim feared that he could "[h]it [her] or kill [her]." Because intent to place the victim in such fear was an essential element of the crime, the court did not err in concluding that the state's proffered evidence was relevant, which necessarily included a finding that the evidence was material. See State v. Rogers, supra, 123 Conn.App. at 861-62, 3 A.3d 194 (relevant evidence is material and probative). The defendant argues that the evidence was immaterial because he implicitly conceded the issue of intent and chose instead to argue that he did not engage in the acts in question. We disagree. Regardless of whether he chose to argue that he did not commit the acts in question instead of contesting the element of intent, he did not explicitly concede this essential element before the trial court. The state, therefore, bore the burden of proving both that the defendant committed the acts in question and that he did so with the intent to
place the victim in imminent fear of serious physical injury. See State v. Irizarry, supra, 95 Conn.App. at 233-34, 896 A.2d 828 . Second, the defendant contends that the probative value of the proffered evidence of prior uncharged misconduct did not outweigh its prejudicial effect. In support of this argument, he offers little more than the assertion that "[t]he state's true intention in introducing this evidence was to persuade the jury that [the defendant] was a violent and threatening person who would not hesitate to draw a knife on someone." We conclude that the court properly balanced the probative value of the evidence against its prejudicial effect.
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